Transporting Padilla to Deportation Proceedings: A Due Process Right to the Effective Assistance of Counsel by Legomsky, Stephen H.
Saint Louis University Public Law Review 
Volume 31 
Number 1 A New Era for Plea Bargaining and 
Sentencing?: The Aftermath of Padilla v. 
Kentucky (Volume XXXI, No. 1) 
Article 6 
2011 
Transporting Padilla to Deportation Proceedings: A Due Process 
Right to the Effective Assistance of Counsel 
Stephen H. Legomsky 
Washington University in St. Louis School of Law, legomsky@wulaw.wustl.edu 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.slu.edu/plr 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Legomsky, Stephen H. (2011) "Transporting Padilla to Deportation Proceedings: A Due Process Right to 
the Effective Assistance of Counsel," Saint Louis University Public Law Review: Vol. 31 : No. 1 , Article 6. 
Available at: https://scholarship.law.slu.edu/plr/vol31/iss1/6 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarship Commons. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in Saint Louis University Public Law Review by an authorized editor of Scholarship Commons. For more 
information, please contact Susie Lee. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
 
43 
 
TRANSPORTING PADILLA TO DEPORTATION PROCEEDINGS: 
A DUE PROCESS RIGHT TO THE EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF 
COUNSEL 
STEPHEN H. LEGOMSKY* 
INTRODUCTION 
In the immigration sphere, issues as to the effectiveness of counsel 
typically arise in two contexts.  In one context, a noncitizen claims that counsel 
was ineffective during the course of deportation proceedings.1  In the other, a 
noncitizen criminal defendant claims that counsel’s deficient advice led the 
noncitizen to plead guilty to a crime that, in turn, put him or her at risk of 
deportation. 
The Supreme Court’s landmark decision in Padilla v. Kentucky2 
transformed that second terrain.  Before Padilla, deportation was merely a 
“collateral” consequence of a criminal conviction; because deportation was not 
part of the criminal sentence, it was not held to be a “direct” consequence.3  
That distinction stemmed from the traditional view that a deportation order is a 
 
* The John S. Lehmann University Professor, Washington University School of Law.  Since 
October 2011, the author has been on leave as Chief Counsel of U.S. Citizenship and Immigration 
Services (USCIS), U.S. Department of Homeland Security.  This article was written, submitted, 
accepted for publication, and posted on the Social Science Research Network before the author’s 
appointment at USCIS.  The views expressed are solely those of the author in his personal 
capacity, not those of the agency. 
 1. Before 1996, the statute distinguished “exclusion” proceedings, in which the government 
sought to bar a noncitizen from entering the United States, from “deportation” proceedings, in 
which the government sought to expel a noncitizen who had already entered the country.  In 
1996, Congress replaced both “exclusion” and “deportation” with the new statutory term 
“removal.”  See Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub. L. 
No. 104-208, § 304(a)(3), 110 Stat. 3009 (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1229a (2006)) 
(adding language regarding removal proceedings to determine inadmissibility or deportability to 
Immigration and Nationality Act section 240).  In this Article, I use the term “deportation” to 
refer only to the latter kind of proceeding. 
 2. 130 S. Ct. 1473 (2010). 
 3. For this reason, the lower courts have uniformly rejected requests to withdraw guilty 
pleas based on the trial judge’s failure to disclose the potential deportation consequences of their 
pleas, absent statutory requirements to the contrary.  See Stephen H. Legomsky, The New Path of 
Immigration Law: Asymmetric Incorporation of Criminal Justice Norms, 64 WASH. & LEE L. 
REV. 469, 516–17 (2007). 
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civil penalty rather than a criminal punishment.4  The difference was critical 
because lower courts had divided over whether counsel’s erroneous advice 
concerning the collateral consequences of a guilty plea, or counsel’s failure to 
advise about those consequences at all, breaches the defendant’s Sixth 
Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel.5 
In Padilla, seven of the nine Justices held that erroneous advice concerning 
the deportation consequences of a guilty plea can constitute ineffective 
assistance of counsel for Sixth Amendment purposes.6  The same seven 
Justices held that the Sixth Amendment also affirmatively obligates defense 
counsel to advise a noncitizen defendant that pleading guilty might lead to 
deportation.7  The five-Justice majority went a step further, requiring defense 
counsel to spell out deportation consequences more precisely when they are 
clear.8 
To reach its decision, the Padilla Court had to revisit the longstanding 
judicial dogma that deportation is purely a “collateral” consequence.9  As the 
Court discovered, deportation cannot be so neatly separated from the criminal 
sentence.  Rather, the Court saw deportation as a kind of hybrid, a different 
animal that challenged the traditional dichotomy.10  The Court’s difficulty in 
classifying deportation as “direct” or “collateral” led it to question whether the 
distinction had any place at all in Sixth Amendment jurisprudence, an issue 
that the “unique nature of deportation”11 enabled the Court to defer. 
The effects of Padilla have spread far beyond deportation.  As the two 
dissenters predicted,12 the decision immediately spurred analogous Sixth 
Amendment challenges—many of them successful—to the validity of guilty 
 
 4. Id. at 511–15. 
 5. See generally Rob A. Justman, The Effects of AEDPA and IIRIRA on Ineffective 
Assistance of Counsel Claims for Failure to Advise Alien Defendants of Deportation 
Consequences of Pleading Guilty to an “Aggravated Felony,” 2004 UTAH L. REV. 701 (2004).  
Lower courts were somewhat more receptive to claims based on erroneous advice than to those 
based on a failure to advise at all.  See, e.g., United States v. Del Rosario, 902 F.2d 55, 59 n.2 
(D.C. Cir. 1990); In re Resendiz, 19 P.3d 1171, 1174 (Cal. 2001). 
 6. Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1482; id. at 1494 (Alito, J., concurring).  To withdraw the plea, the 
defendant must also show prejudice in addition to deficient counsel.  Strickland v. Washington, 
466 U.S. 668, 692 (1984).  Because that issue had not been litigated below, the Court remanded 
for a prejudice determination.  Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1487. 
 7. Id. at 1486; id. at 1494 (Alito, J., concurring). 
 8. Id. at 1483 (majority opinion).  Justice Alito and Chief Justice Roberts would have 
required disclosure that deportation was possible but no further advice concerning the likelihood 
or the specifics.  Id. at 1494 (Alito, J., concurring). 
 9. See Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 730 (1892); Bugajewitz v. Adams, 
228 U.S. 585, 591 (1913). 
 10. Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1482. 
 11. Id. at 1481. 
 12. Id. at 1496 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
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pleas that were entered after counsel’s deficient advice concerning a wide 
range of other collateral consequences.13  Developments are unfolding rapidly, 
and scholarly commentary has already begun to accumulate.14 
While Padilla continues to inspire rapid-fire changes for deportation-
related duties of criminal defense counsel, similar drama has been unfolding in 
the other immigration arena in which counsel’s effectiveness is commonly 
contested—counsel’s performance during the deportation proceedings 
themselves.  Because deportation proceedings are not formally criminal, the 
Sixth Amendment is inapplicable.15  Still, the Board of Immigration Appeals 
(hereinafter “B.I.A.”) and the courts have long held that Fifth Amendment due 
process provides a right to counsel in deportation proceedings, albeit not 
necessarily at government expense.16  Congress has given that right statutory 
recognition.17  The B.I.A. and most courts have also assumed that the 
constitutional right to counsel implies a constitutional right to effective counsel, 
at least when the proceeding would otherwise be “fundamentally unfair.”18 
In 2009, however, Attorney General Mukasey, exercising his power to 
review decisions of the B.I.A.,19 decided Matter of Compean.20  He held that 
there is no due process or other constitutional right to the effective assistance 
of counsel in deportation proceedings,21  although he did acknowledge the 
discretionary power of immigration adjudicators to reopen deportation 
 
 13. See, e.g., Kimberly Atkins, Defense Counsel’s Duty to Warn About . . . Everything?: 
‘Padilla’ Ruling by U.S. Supreme Court Extending Far Beyond Deportation Cases, LAW. WKLY. 
USA, Nov. 8, 2010; see also Gabriel J. Chin & Margaret Colgate Love, Status as Punishment: A 
Critical Guide to Padilla v. Kentucky (Ariz. Legal Studies, Discussion Paper No. 10-21, 2010) 
(forecasting and praising the extension of Padilla to other contexts previously dismissed as 
collateral). 
 14. See supra note 13 and the other articles included in this publication; see also Gabriel J. 
Chin, Making Padilla Practical: Defense Counsel and Collateral Consequences at Guilty Plea, 54 
HOW. L.J. 675, 675–78 (2011); Anita Ortiz Maddali, Padilla v. Kentucky: A New Chapter in 
Supreme Court Jurisprudence on Whether Deportation Constitutes Punishment for Lawful 
Permanent Residents?, 61 AM. U. L. REV. 1 (2011). 
 15. See In re Magallanes-Damian v. INS, 783 F.2d 931, 933 (9th Cir. 1986). 
 16. See, e.g., id.; Paul v. INS, 521 F.2d 194, 197–98 (5th Cir. 1975); In re Lozada, 19 I. & 
N. Dec. 637, 638 (B.I.A. 1988), aff’d, Lozada v. INS, 857 F.2d 10 (1st Cir. 1988). 
 17. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(b)(4)(A) (2006); id. § 1362. 
 18. See, e.g., Lozada, 19 I. & N. Dec. at 638; Nehad v. Mukasey, 535 F.3d 962, 967 (9th Cir. 
2008); Aris v. Mukasey, 517 F.3d 595, 600–01 (2d Cir. 2008); Zeru v. Gonzales, 503 F.3d 59, 72 
(1st Cir. 2007); Fadiga v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 488 F.3d 142, 155 (3d Cir. 2007); Sene v. Gonzales, 
453 F.3d 383, 386 (6th Cir. 2006); Dakane v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 399 F.3d 1269, 1274 (11th Cir. 
2005).  Some have rejected such a right.  See, e.g., Rafiyev v. Mukasey, 536 F.3d 853, 861 (8th 
Cir. 2008); Afanwi v. Mukasey, 526 F.3d 788, 798–99 (4th Cir. 2008); Magala v. Gonzales, 434 
F.3d 523, 525 (7th Cir. 2005). 
 19. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(h) (2009). 
 20. 24 I. & N. Dec. 710 (A.G. 2009), vacated, 25 I. & N. Dec. 1 (A.G. 2009). 
 21. Id. at 714. 
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proceedings upon a showing of “egregious” incompetence of counsel.22  In 
addition, he imposed new substantive and procedural constraints on the 
adjudicators’ discretion to reopen.23  That decision was short-lived.  Attorney 
General Holder vacated the decision later the same year, on grounds not 
relevant here, but declined to address the constitutional issue.24 
The purpose of this Article is to link these two lines of cases.  My thesis is 
that the logic of Padilla, quite apart from its sweeping implications for the 
constitutional duties of criminal defense counsel, also helps resolve the 
constitutional issue left unsettled by Compean and its overruling: Is there a 
constitutional right to the effective assistance of counsel in deportation 
proceedings? 
This issue assumes heightened importance in an era in which annual 
removal proceedings now number in the hundreds of thousands.25  The Justice 
Department’s Executive Office for Immigration Review, the umbrella agency 
that houses the immigration judges who preside over removal proceedings,26 
reported that in 2008 approximately 42% of the respondents in those 
proceedings were represented by counsel.27  In removal cases that involve 
asylum, roughly two-thirds of the applicants in fiscal year 1999 had managed 
to procure counsel.28  As discussed further below,29 representation by counsel 
greatly increases the respondent’s chance of success, both generally30 and in 
 
 22. Id. at 728. 
 23. Id. at 732–39. 
 24. Attorney General Holder felt that the rulemaking process would be a more appropriate 
vehicle for reevaluating the administrative framework previously in place.  In re Compean, 25 I. 
& N. Dec. 1 (A.G. 2009).  For some useful pre-Padilla commentary on Compean and its 
overruling, see Jean Pierre Espinoza, Ineffective Assistance of Counsel in Removal Proceedings – 
Matter of Compean and the Fundamental Fairness Doctrine, 22 FLA. J. INT’L  L. 65 (2010); Aliza 
B. Kaplan, A New Approach to Ineffective Assistance of Counsel in Removal Proceedings, 62 
RUTGERS L. REV. 345 (2010). 
 25. Over 318,000 removal proceedings were initiated in fiscal year 2010.  U.S. DEP’T OF 
JUSTICE, FY 2010 STATISTICAL YEARBOOK C3 tbl.3 (2011), available at http://www.justice. 
gov/eoir/statspub/fy10syb.pdf. 
 26. 8 C.F.R. §§ 1003.9(a), 1003.10(a) (2010). 
 27. More Than Half of Immigration Respondents Without Work, 85 INTERPRETER RELEASES 
2445 (2008). 
 28. Andrew I. Schoenholtz & Jonathan Jacobs, The State of Asylum Representation: Ideas 
for Change, 16 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 739, 772 tbl.7 (2002).  “Affirmative” asylum applications are 
first adjudicated by the USCIS asylum officers, and the representation rates at those interviews 
are lower — 34% in fiscal year 1999.  Id. at 770 tbl.6.  Because this Article is concerned solely 
with representation in removal proceedings, those data are less relevant, even though more than 
80% of all the asylum claims filed in removal proceedings during the period studied originated in 
the USCIS asylum offices.  Id. at 742. 
 29. See infra notes 51–53 and accompanying text. 
 30. Donald Kerwin, Charitable Legal Programs for Immigrants: What They Do, Why They 
Matter and How They Can Be Expanded, IMMIGR. BRIEFINGS, June 2004, at 6. 
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asylum cases.31  There would be little reason to expect such a correlation 
unless the representation is at least minimally effective.  Sadly, it often is not.32 
Since even Attorney General Mukasey’s opinion in Compean recognized 
the discretionary power of immigration adjudicators to reopen deportation 
proceedings in cases of ineffective assistance,33 one might ask why it matters 
whether the ineffective assistance claim in deportation proceedings is of 
constitutional stature.  There are several reasons.  First, the governing statute 
recognizes a right to counsel in deportation proceedings but does not speak 
explicitly to whether that right encompasses effective assistance.34  It was that 
ambiguity that left Attorney General Mukasey free to define the statutory 
power of adjudicators to redress ineffective assistance as narrowly as he 
wished.  And if Compean is any indication, his wish was to define that power 
narrowly indeed.35  The scope of the adjudicators’ authority can thus swing 
back and forth each time the Administration changes hands—precisely the 
scenario illustrated by the Compean decision and its subsequent overruling.  
Second, without constitutional constraints, Congress itself could define the 
prerequisites to ineffective assistance claims in such narrow terms that very 
few errors by counsel would be cognizable.  Alternatively, Congress could 
explicitly provide that any claim of ineffective assistance rests solely on the 
power of the Attorney General to set the parameters and the discretion of the 
adjudicators to apply them.  More radically still, Congress could entirely bar 
motions to reopen deportation proceedings based on claims of ineffective 
assistance.  Constitutionalizing the right to effective assistance in deportation 
proceedings thus insulates the right itself from shifting political winds in an 
increasingly inflammatory environment.  It also ensures a meaningful judicial 
role in reviewing any substantive or procedural prerequisites that Congress, the 
Attorney General, or the immigration adjudicators should choose to impose. 
Section I of this Article suggests that Attorney General Mukasey’s 
conclusions in Compean rested on shaky ground even before Padilla.  Section 
II considers the pre-Padilla evolution of the theory that deportation is not 
punishment.  In Section III, I argue that Padilla now offers support for 
recognizing a due process right to the effective assistance of counsel in 
deportation cases. 
 
 31. Schoenholtz & Jacobs, supra note 28, at 743–45. 
 32. See In re Compean, 24 I. & N. Dec. 710, 728 (A.G. 2009) (citing judicial commentary 
on lapses by attorneys representing noncitizens in removal proceedings), vacated, 25 I. & N. Dec. 
1 (A.G. 2009). 
 33. Id. at 739–41. 
 34. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(b)(4)(A) (2006). 
 35. See infra note 41. 
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I.  COMPEAN BEFORE PADILLA 
Attorney General Mukasey’s decision in Matter of Compean consolidated 
three cases.36  In each, an undocumented immigrant had appealed the B.I.A.’s 
refusal to reopen removal proceedings.37  Each argued ineffective assistance of 
retained counsel in connection with their applications for affirmative relief 
from removal.38  Disapproving two earlier B.I.A. precedents, the Attorney 
General announced that there was no Fifth Amendment due process right to the 
effective assistance of counsel in removal proceedings.39  Nor, he added, is 
there a statutory right to effective assistance in those proceedings.40  He 
acknowledged that immigration judges and the B.I.A. have the discretion to 
reopen removal proceedings and that the “deficient performance” of counsel is 
a permissible ground for exercising that discretion, but even as to that, he 
imposed new and more demanding substantive and procedural prerequisites to 
doing so.41 
Even before Padilla, Attorney General Mukasey’s conclusion that the 
Constitution provides no right to the effective assistance of counsel in 
deportation proceedings rested on some thin reeds.  Two broad themes can be 
distilled from Compean.  The dominant theme was that the absence of a 
constitutional right to the effective assistance of counsel somehow follows 
from the absence of a right, in deportation proceedings, of government-
appointed counsel.  Surely, this is a non sequitur.  Let us assume arguendo that 
Congress can constitutionally deny appointed counsel in deportation 
 
 36. 24 I. & N. Dec. 710. 
 37. Id. at 714–16. 
 38. Id. 
 39. Id. at 727. 
 40. Id. 
 41. Substantively, counsel’s error must be “egregious”; the motion to reopen must have been 
filed within the relevant time limits unless the movant can show due diligence in discovering and 
seeking to cure counsel’s errors; and the movant must establish that the lawyer’s shortcomings 
prejudiced the outcome.  Id. at 732–33.  The prejudice standard, the Attorney General held, 
requires a showing that but for the errors of counsel, the movant “more likely than not” would 
have been “entitled to the ultimate relief he was seeking.”  Id. at 734.  Procedurally, the movant 
must submit a detailed affidavit setting out all the relevant facts, including the lawyer’s 
deficiencies and the harm they caused.  Id. at 735.  In addition, the movant must submit five 
documents: (1) a copy of the attorney-client agreement or a statement in the affidavit describing 
what the lawyer had agreed to do; (2) a letter to former counsel setting out the alleged 
deficiencies and counsel’s reply, if there was one; (3) a completed and signed (but not necessarily 
filed) complaint to the appropriate disciplinary authority; (4) a copy of the evidence or arguments 
that the movant faults counsel for failing to offer; and (5) a signed statement by the current 
attorney (if there is one) stating his or her belief that former counsel’s performance fell below 
minimal professional standards.  Id. at 736–39 (modifying the various requirements from criteria 
previously announced by the B.I.A. in In re Lozada). 
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proceedings.42  Why should the fact that the government is not obligated to 
appoint counsel mean that those noncitizens who obtain private counsel 
without the government’s help have no right to effective assistance?  Perhaps 
Attorney General Mukasey thought it unfair that those wealthy enough to 
afford private counsel would thus acquire a constitutional right unavailable to 
the indigent.  But the question is not one of differential treatment.  It is simply 
the reality that the effective assistance issue does not arise in pro se cases. 
A separate theme of the Mukasey opinion appears to be that, for due 
process purposes, the actions of private counsel are not government action.  
For this line of argument, the Attorney General relied on dictum in Shelley v. 
Kraemer to the effect that due process does not apply to private conduct.43  
Indeed it does not, but more than private conduct is involved here, and on that 
score Shelley is a surprising choice of cases.  That eminent decision is best 
known for its holding that the use of the courts to enforce a racially 
discriminatory land covenant would qualify as state action.44  In the present 
context, the use of the immigration court and the B.I.A. to effect a deportation 
resulting from the ineffective assistance of counsel would similarly be state 
action.45  If that state action renders the proceeding fundamentally unfair—a 
question of fact—then due process should be held to have been violated. 
Those two themes—the absence of a right to appointed counsel and the 
absence of government action—are not entirely independent of one another.  If 
there were a due process right to appointed counsel in removal proceedings 
and the government were to deny the respondent that right, then perhaps one 
could impute privately retained counsel’s ineffective assistance to the 
government, thus supplying the government action essential to a due process 
claim.  But the converse does not follow.  As Shelley v. Kraemer illustrates, the 
judgment of a court can supply the requisite state action whether or not the 
government was constitutionally required to appoint counsel in the first place. 
In Mathews v. Eldridge, the Supreme Court laid out the factors that courts 
must generally weigh in determining whether due process requires a particular 
procedural safeguard in an administrative adjudication: 
 
 42. In some non-criminal contexts, there is a constitutional right to government-appointed 
counsel.  See, e.g., Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778 (1973) (requiring appointed counsel in 
proceedings to revoke parole); In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967) (requiring appointment of counsel 
in juvenile delinquency proceedings). 
 43. Compean, 24 I. & N. Dec. at 717 (citing Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 13 (1948)). 
 44. Shelley, 334 U.S. at 20. 
 45. Professor Kaplan makes a similar point, observing that in criminal cases the private 
status of retained counsel has not prevented the courts from finding state action for purposes of 
ineffective assistance claims.  Kaplan, supra note 24, at 358.  Those decisions cannot be 
distinguished on the basis that the Sixth Amendment provides a right to counsel in criminal cases, 
because, as she notes, the right to effective assistance of retained counsel in (state) criminal 
prosecutions has also been grounded in due process.  Id. at 358–59. 
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First, the private interest that will be affected by the official action; second, the 
risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, 
and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural 
safeguards; and finally, the Government’s interest, including the function 
involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or 
substitute procedural requirement would entail.46 
The nature and magnitude of the private interests at stake in deportation 
cases will vary with the circumstances of the respondent.  Variables might 
include the person’s immigration status—lawful permanent resident, lawfully 
present nonimmigrant, other miscellaneous lawful status, or undocumented—
as well as personal circumstances, such as the duration of the person’s 
presence in the United States, employment or other financial implications of 
deportation, and family and community ties to both the United States and the 
country of origin.  There is no question, however, that the potential severity of 
deportation is extremely high, a point that the Court highlighted in Padilla.47  
And when the individual is applying for asylum or for relief under the 
Convention Against Torture, an erroneous rejection can result in persecution48 
or torture.49 
The second Mathews factor is the value of the particular procedural 
ingredient, in this case the effective assistance of counsel, in preventing the 
erroneous deprivation of that private interest.50  As an empirical matter, there is 
today no doubt that representation by counsel correlates positively with 
respondents’ likelihood of success in removal proceedings generally51 and in 
asylum cases specifically.52 
Admittedly, correlation alone does not prove causation.  It might well be, 
for example, that those noncitizens whose cases are not reasonably “winnable” 
are less likely to seek counsel or that counsel are less willing to take on such 
cases.  It is entirely possible, therefore, that the higher success rates for 
represented respondents can be partly attributed to the strength of their claims. 
 
 46. 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976). 
 47. 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1486 (2010). 
 48.  8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42) (2006) (basing “refugee” status on “persecution”); id. § 
1158(b)(1)(A) (requiring “refugee” status for asylum). 
 49. Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, arts. 1 & 3, Inhuman or Degrading 
Treatment or Punishment, Dec. 10, 1984, 108. Stat. 392, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85 (defining “torture” 
and prohibiting return of a person to a State “where there are substantial grounds for believing 
that he would be in danger of being subjected to torture”); see also Foreign Affairs Reform and 
Restructuring Act of 1998, Pub. L. No.105-277, § 2242(a), 112 Stat. 2681, 822 (stating analogous 
U.S. policy). 
 50. 424 U.S. at 335. 
 51. Kerwin, supra note 30, at 6. 
 52. Schoenholtz & Jacobs, supra note 28, at 743–45. 
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Even if one assumes a biased sample, however, it would be surprising if, 
on average, representation by counsel did not enhance the respondent’s 
chances of winning a meritorious case.  Counsel can do many things that lay 
respondents will ordinarily be ill equipped to do without help or advice.  On 
questions of fact, counsel can glean the relevant information from the client, 
further investigate the facts before the hearing, assemble documents, line up 
witnesses, and cross-examine opposing witnesses.  A respondent might be 
more willing to confide relevant facts to his or her counsel than to the 
adjudicator who would decide the case.  Immigration law is highly complex; 
counsel will be far more likely than a lay person—particularly a lay person 
whose foreign origins leave him or her less familiar with American law, 
American culture, and even the English language—to understand the relevant 
law.  Counsel will be better situated to spot issues, identify possible affirmative 
remedies and other defenses, research the law, have a sense of which defenses 
were successful in previous cases, and present the arguments in an orderly and 
convincing fashion.  If the respondent is applying for asylum, counsel will be 
able to identify and assemble the meticulous documentation essential to 
establishing a claim of persecution.  Counsel will know when it makes sense to 
appeal and when it makes sense to move to reopen or reconsider.  Moreover, 
the government will always be represented by a specialized attorney whenever 
removability is contested;53 the unrepresented respondent will therefore be at a 
keen, arguably unfair, disadvantage. 
Thus, there are several ways in which counsel can protect the respondent’s 
legitimate interests.  Each of those benefits is ephemeral, however, if counsel is 
incompetent—i.e., if counsel fails to provide effective assistance.  Ineffective 
assistance might even be worse than no counsel at all.  When a noncitizen is 
unrepresented, the immigration judge might feel a greater obligation to identify 
possible avenues of relief or to ask relevant questions that might put the 
alleged grounds for deportation in doubt.  In asylum cases, a pro se applicant 
might be unfamiliar with the legal elements essential to relief and thus unable 
to appreciate what evidence will be necessary to substantiate the claim.  A 
conscientious adjudicator can ask the relevant questions. 
The final Mathews factor is the government’s interest in dispensing with 
the particular procedural ingredient.54  Here, the issue is not whether the 
government has an interest in declining to provide counsel at public expense.  
Rather, the government’s interest is in not insisting that the respondent’s 
privately retained counsel render effective assistance.  That interest is not 
trivial.  As Attorney General Mukasey observed in Compean, granting a 
motion to reopen removal proceedings on the ground that counsel’s assistance 
 
 53. 8 C.F.R. §§ 1240.2(b), 1240.10(d) (2010). 
 54. Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335. 
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was ineffective delays the ultimate resolution of the case;55 moreover, even 
meritless motions to reopen burden the adjudication system.  As Attorney 
General Mukasey emphasized, these considerations take on added weight in 
the light of respondents’ inherent incentives to delay the completion of 
deportation proceedings in order to prolong their stays in the United States.56 
But these are not the only public interests at stake.  First, as Attorney 
General Mukasey acknowledged, the public also has an interest in assuring 
“the fairness and accuracy of removal proceedings.”57  Second, the 
immigration judges prefer that respondents be represented by counsel because 
counsel can present the cases both more effectively and more efficiently, and 
respondents who are represented by counsel are more likely to appear for their 
hearings.58  Again, these benefits to the government depend on counsel being 
effective. 
There are major flaws, then, in both the reasons offered in Compean for 
rejecting a constitutional right to the effective assistance of counsel in 
deportation proceedings and in the unacknowledged practical consequences to 
which that conclusion leads.  In Padilla, the Supreme Court supplied positive 
ammunition for the recognition of a constitutional right to the effective 
assistance of counsel in deportation proceedings.  To understand why this is so, 
one must consider how the Court’s conception of deportation has now 
fundamentally changed. 
II.  THE CHARACTER OF DEPORTATION 
The idea that deportation is not punishment originated with the Supreme 
Court’s 1893 decision in Fong Yue Ting v. United States.59  The case is best 
known both for being the first to recognize a congressional power to deport 
noncitizens and for apparently disclaiming any judicial authority to impose due 
process limits on Congress’s exercise of that power.60  In the same case, the 
Court set another process in motion — one that would ultimately preclude the 
application of several important constitutional rights to noncitizens in 
deportation proceedings.  The Court declared that deportation is not a form of 
punishment.61  Its sole rationale for that conclusion read as follows: 
 
 55. 24 I. & N. Dec. 710, 730 (A.G. 2009), vacated, 25 I. & N. Dec. 1 (A.G. 2009). 
 56. Id. at 729. 
 57. Id. at 728. 
 58. Schoenholtz & Jacobs, supra note 28, at 746. 
 59. 149 U.S. 698, 730 (1893).  The evolution of the idea that deportation is not punishment 
is laid out in more detail in STEPHEN H. LEGOMSKY, IMMIGRATION AND THE JUDICIARY: LAW 
AND POLITICS IN BRITAIN AND AMERICA 208–09 (1987). 
 60. The latter aspect of Fong Yue Ting is no longer good law.  It is now well-settled that 
procedural due process constraints apply in deportation proceedings.  See, e.g., Wong Yang Sung 
v. McGrath, 339 U.S. 33, 50–51 (1950); Yamataya v. Fisher, 189 U.S. 86, 100–01 (1903). 
 61. Fong Yue Ting, 149 U.S. at 730. 
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  [A deportation proceeding] is in no proper sense a trial and sentence for a 
crime or offence.  It is simply the ascertainment . . . of the fact whether the 
conditions exist upon which Congress has enacted that an alien of this class 
may remain within the country.  The order of deportation is not a punishment 
for crime.  It is not a banishment, in the sense in which that word is often 
applied to the expulsion of a citizen from his country by way of punishment.  It 
is but a method of enforcing the return to his own country of an alien who has 
not complied with the conditions upon the performance of which the 
government of the nation . . . has determined that his continuing to reside here 
shall depend.62 
That description did not adequately distinguish deportation from criminal 
punishment, because an analogous description might well be offered for 
incarceration—probably the clearest form of criminal punishment.  One can 
scarcely imagine the Court suggesting that a criminal sentence of incarceration 
is not punishment because “[i]t is but a method of enforcing [the transfer to a 
detention facility of a person] who has not complied with the conditions upon 
the performance of which the government of the nation . . . has determined that 
his continuing to reside [in society] shall depend.”63  The Court’s conclusion 
that deportation is non-punitive seems more definitional than substantive. 
The Supreme Court continued in the same vein in Bugajewitz v. Adams.64  
There it rejected a noncitizen’s argument that the Ex Post Facto Clause 
prohibits Congress from prescribing deportation retroactively—i.e., when the 
conduct had not been a basis for deportation at the time the conduct occurred.65  
The Court had previously interpreted the Ex Post Facto Clause as applicable 
only to criminal punishment.66  In Bugajewitz, the Court dismissed the ex post 
facto challenge by labeling deportation non-punitive.67  In support of its 
finding, the Court simply said that deportation is merely “a refusal by the 
government to harbor persons whom it does not want.”68  That rationale 
likewise does little to distinguish deportation from criminal incarceration 
because one central purpose of the latter is, similarly, to isolate an undesirable 
person from society. 
 
 62. Id.  The Court declared that a deported alien “has not, therefore, been deprived of life, 
liberty, or property, without due process of law.”  Id.  This secondary conclusion is puzzling 
because the characterization of a particular consequence as punishment is not now, e.g., Mathews 
v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 348 (1976); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 270 (1970), and was not 
even then, e.g., Windsor v. McVeigh, 93 U.S. 274, 277–78 (1876); Baldwin v. Hale, 68 U.S. (1 
Wall.) 223, 233 (1863), essential to a due process claim. 
 63. Fong Yue Ting, 149 U.S. at 730. 
 64. 228 U.S. 585, 591 (1913). 
 65. Id. 590–91. 
 66. Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (1 Dall.) 386, 390 (1798). 
 67. 228 U.S. at 591. 
 68. Id. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
54 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY PUBLIC LAW REVIEW [Vol. XXXI:43 
From those two early decisions until Padilla, the Supreme Court strictly 
adhered to the mantra that deportation is not punishment.69  In doing so, it 
added no substantive rationales to the definitional offerings of Fong Yue Ting 
and Bugajewitz.  In case after case, the Court was content simply to cite what 
by then had become a mountain of precedent.70  The case law accumulated. 
III.  COMPEAN AFTER PADILLA 
Then came Padilla.71  Padilla, a lawful permanent resident of the United 
States, pleaded guilty in state court to transportation of marijuana.72  The 
resulting conviction gave rise to removal proceedings.73  Padilla requested 
post-conviction relief on Sixth Amendment grounds of ineffective assistance of 
counsel.74  He alleged that his criminal defense attorney had wrongly advised 
him that pleading guilty would not lead to deportation and that he would not 
have pleaded guilty had he received accurate advice.75  The question before the 
Court was the scope of criminal defense counsel’s Sixth Amendment duties 
concerning advice about the potential deportation consequences of their 
clients’ guilty pleas.76 
As noted earlier, pre-Padilla lower courts had divided over that question.77  
Driven by the Supreme Court’s consistent pronouncements that deportation is 
not punishment, the lower courts had routinely classified deportation as a 
purely “collateral” matter rather than a “direct” consequence of a criminal 
conviction.78  For that reason, absent legislation to the contrary, the lower 
courts had generally held that the criminal trial judge has no duty to advise the 
defendant of the potential deportation consequences before accepting a guilty 
 
 69. See, e.g., Lapina v. Williams, 232 U.S. 78, 88 (1914); Lewis v. Frick, 233 U.S. 291, 296 
(1914); Ng Fung Ho v. White, 259 U.S. 276, 280 (1922); Mahler v. Eby, 264 U.S. 32, 39 (1924); 
United States ex rel. Eichenlaub v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 521, 529 n.15 (1950); Harisiades v. 
Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580, 594–95 (1952); Galvan v. Press, 347 U.S. 522, 531 (1954); Marcello 
v. Bonds, 349 U.S. 302, 314 (1955); Lehmann v. United States ex rel. Carson, 353 U.S. 685, 690 
n.4 (1957); Mulcahey v. Catalanotte, 353 U.S. 692, 694 n.5 (1957). 
 70. See cases cited supra note 69. 
 71. 130 S. Ct. 1473 (2010). 
 72. Id. at 1477. 
 73. Id. at 1478. 
 74. Id. 
 75. Id. 
 76. Id. 
 77. See supra note 5 and accompanying text. 
 78. E.g., El-Nobani v. United States, 287 F.3d 417, 421 (6th Cir. 2002); United States v. 
Banda, 1 F.3d 354, 356 (5th Cir. 1993) (“We are not aware of any court that has held to the 
contrary.”); Varela v. Kaiser, 976 F.2d 1357, 1358 (10th Cir. 1992) (citing a variety of cases from 
other circuits that have also reached the conclusion that deportation is a collateral consequence). 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
2011] TRANSPORTING PADILLA TO DEPORTATION PROCEEDINGS 55 
plea.79  The Sixth Amendment duties of defense counsel presented a different 
question. 
By a vote of 7-2, the Supreme Court held in Padilla that, for Sixth 
Amendment purposes, defense counsel has both an affirmative duty to advise a 
noncitizen defendant that a guilty plea might lead to deportation and the duty to 
avoid mistaken advice on that subject.80  A smaller majority of five Justices 
requires counsel to elaborate further when the deportation consequence is 
“truly clear,” as it was in Padilla.81 
To reach those results, the Court had to rethink traditional judicial 
assumptions about the nature of deportation.  Its thinking is encapsulated in the 
following excerpt: 
  We have long recognized that deportation is a particularly severe 
“penalty,” but it is not, in a strict sense, a criminal sanction.  Although removal 
proceedings are civil in nature, deportation is nevertheless intimately related to 
the criminal process.  Our law has enmeshed criminal convictions and the 
penalty of deportation for nearly a century.  And, importantly, recent changes 
in our immigration law have made removal nearly an automatic result for a 
broad class of noncitizen offenders.  Thus, we find it “most difficult” to 
divorce the penalty from the conviction in the deportation context.  Moreover, 
we are quite confident that noncitizen defendants facing a risk of deportation 
for a particular offense find it even more difficult. 
  Deportation as a consequence of a criminal conviction is, because of its 
close connection to the criminal process, uniquely difficult to classify as either 
a direct or a collateral consequence.  The collateral versus direct distinction is 
thus ill-suited to evaluating a Strickland claim concerning the specific risk of 
deportation.82 
Thus, in one quick stroke, the Court relegated to the dustbin the long line 
of musty cases that had dismissed constitutional challenges to deportation 
orders simply by intoning that deportation is not punishment.  For the first 
time, the Court opted for a functional approach that rests on reality rather than 
legal fiction.  It felt no need to classify deportation as civil or criminal or to 
classify its consequences as collateral or direct.  In effect, the Court held 
deportation was neither fish nor fowl.  It has the feel and some of the attributes 
of a civil regulatory model,83 but it is also very closely linked to the criminal 
process in ways that the Court spelled out in detail.84  The Court thereby 
 
 79. See People v. Pozo, 746 P.2d 523, 526 (Colo. 1987) (offering long string citation of 
cases rejecting trial judge duty to advise of risk of deportation before accepting guilty plea). 
 80. 130 S. Ct. at 1486; id. at 1494 (Alito, J., concurring). 
 81. Id. at 1483 (majority opinion). 
 82. Id. at 1481–82 (citations omitted). 
 83. For the differences between the civil regulatory model and the criminal justice model, 
see Legomsky, supra note 3, at 474–75. 
 84. Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1482. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
56 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY PUBLIC LAW REVIEW [Vol. XXXI:43 
concluded that deportation occupies a middle ground situated somewhere 
between a civil penalty and a criminal punishment.85 
But what about those deportation proceedings in which the charge does not 
rest on a criminal conviction?  Noncitizens are routinely removed from the 
United States because of their unlawful presence86 or any number of other 
grounds.87  The Court’s emphasis was on the close link between a criminal 
conviction and the deportation order that it triggers.88  That theory for 
characterizing deportation as a kind of civil-criminal hybrid does not readily 
carry over to deportation proceedings that are not grounded on criminal 
convictions. 
There was, however, another key element of the Court’s rationale.  After 
exploring the inseparability of deportation from the criminal conviction that 
precedes it, the Court added: “The severity of deportation—‘the equivalent of 
banishment or exile’—only underscores how critical it is for counsel to inform 
her noncitizen client that he faces a risk of deportation.”89  It was not just the 
nature of deportation, then, but the severity as well which influenced the Court 
to conceptualize deportation as a penalty that defies clear categorization as 
civil or criminal.  That functional approach has historical echoes,90 reflects the 
reality of the legal world in which deportations are carried out, and applies 
with equal force to deportations not predicated upon criminal convictions. 
Severity alone, of course, does not make a consequence punishment.  An 
automobile accident can cause death, but that fact alone does not make such 
accidents punitive.  More is necessary.  In the case of deportation, two other 
 
 85. Id. 
 86. See, e.g., 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(A) (2006) (present without having been admitted); id. § 
1227(a)(1)(B) (present in violation of law); id. § 1227(a)(1)(C)(i) (noncompliance with terms of 
nonimmigrant status). 
 87. See, e.g., id. § 1182(a) (listing grounds of inadmissibility); id. § 1227(a) (listing grounds 
of deportability). 
 88. Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1481–82. 
 89. Id. at 1486 (quoting Delgadillo v. Carmichael, 332 U.S. 388, 391 (1947)). 
 90. See James Madison, Madison’s Report on the Virginia Resolutions, in 4 ELLIOT’S 
DEBATES ON THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 546, 555 (1836) (“[I]t can never be admitted that the 
removal of aliens, authorized by the [Aliens Act], is to be considered, not as punishment for an 
offence, but as a measure of precaution and prevention. . . . [I]f a banishment of this sort be not a 
punishment, and among the severest of punishments, it will be difficult to imagine a doom to 
which the name can be applied.”); see also Galvan v. Press, 347 U.S. 522, 533 (1954) (Black, J., 
dissenting) (“[A deported person] loses his job, his friends, his home, and maybe even his 
children, who must choose between their father and their native country.”); Ng Fung Ho v. White, 
259 U.S. 276, 284 (1922) (“[Deportation] may result also in loss of both property and life, or of 
all that makes life worth living.”); Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 740 (1893) 
(Brewer, J., dissenting) (“Every one knows that to be forcibly taken away from home and family 
and friends and business and property, and sent across the ocean to a distant land is 
punishment . . . .”). 
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elements are present.  One is historical.  As others have shown, banishment has 
been a common form of criminal punishment from ancient times through at 
least the nineteenth century.91 
Second, the core objectives of deportation overlap substantially, if not 
fully, with those of the criminal justice system.  I first offered that argument as 
a student many years ago,92 and I excavate it here because the Court’s decision 
in Padilla gives it contemporary traction.  The premise will be that if 
constitutional consequences are going to turn on their classification as 
punishment, then the classification should reflect the underlying reasons for 
prescribing those consequences in the first place.  The Supreme Court has 
proceeded from that premise in several contexts, including the citizenship 
context.93 
With that premise, the arguments that I set out in the 1977 student piece 
can be summarized briefly: the purposes of deportation bear a striking 
resemblance to those of criminal punishment.  One traditional purpose of 
criminal punishment is incapacitation—isolating an offender from society.94  
As discussed earlier, the same can be said of the purpose associated with 
deportation—ridding society of a person whose presence in the general 
population is undesirable.95  Other traditional purposes of punishment are 
specific and general deterrence—discouraging wrongdoers from repeating 
deviant behavior and discouraging others from emulating that behavior.96  
Deportation could similarly be seen as a vehicle for deterring both the 
particular individual and others from future similar acts.  The one, admittedly 
important, element of criminal punishment that does not correlate with 
 
 91. See, e.g., Javier Bleichmar, Deportation as Punishment: A Historical Analysis of the 
British Practice of Banishment and Its Impact on Modern Constitutional Law, 14 GEO. IMMIGR. 
L.J. 115 (1999); Stephen H. Legomsky, Note, Deportation of an Alien for a Marijuana 
Conviction Can Constitute Cruel and Unusual Punishment: Lieggi v. United States Immigration 
and Naturalization Service, 13 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 454, 458 (1976); Peter L. Markowitz, 
Straddling the Civil-Criminal Divide: A Bifurcated Approach to Understanding the Nature of 
Immigration Removal Proceedings, 43 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 289, 320–27 (2008). 
 92. See Stephen H. Legomsky, The Alien Criminal Defendant: Sentencing Considerations, 
15 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 105, 121–27 (1977) (correlating the theories, justifications, and 
consequences of deportation with those of criminal punishment). 
 93. See, e.g., Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144 (1963); Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 
86 (1958) (plurality opinion) (examining whether statutes that purported to take away U.S. 
citizenship shared the same purposes as criminal punishment).  In applying the constitutional 
prohibitions of ex post facto laws and bills of attainder, both clauses that had been interpreted as 
limited to punishment, the Supreme Court has similarly classified certain formally civil sanctions 
as criminal punishment.  See United States v. Lovett, 328 U.S. 303 (1946); Cummings v. 
Missouri, 71 U.S. (1 Wall.) 277 (1866). 
 94. Richard S. Frase, Punishment Purposes, 58 STAN. L. REV. 67, 70 (2005). 
 95. See Bugajewitz v. Adams, 228 U.S. 585, 591 (1913). 
 96. Frase, supra note 94, at 70–71. 
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deportation quite so precisely is retribution.  Even as to that, however, 
deportations that are based on the commission of wrongful acts (and that 
description could embrace not only post-entry criminal conduct but also illegal 
entry and even knowingly overstaying a temporary visa) could well be seen as 
retributive.97 
Thus, while the Court in Padilla emphasized the functional links between 
deportation and criminal justice, the compelling similarities in the objectives of 
the two systems reinforce the Court’s characterization of deportation as a civil-
criminal hybrid.  That characterization, in turn, further strengthens the case for 
a constitutional right to the effective assistance of counsel.  The same factors 
that necessitate such a right in criminal cases suggest a similar result in a 
setting that bears so many functional similarities to the criminal justice system. 
I do not invoke the Sixth Amendment as the source of that constitutional 
right.  The Sixth Amendment is, after all, expressly limited to “criminal 
prosecutions,”98 and even the Supreme Court in Padilla depicted deportation 
proceedings only as a criminal-civil hybrid,99 not a subspecies of criminal 
proceedings.  Nor do my 1977 arguments demonstrate complete congruence 
between the goals of deportation and criminal justice; they suggest only a close 
resemblance.  The retribution rationale of criminal punishment applies more 
clearly to traditional criminal prosecutions than to the deportation sanction.  
Rather, my view is that the constitutional right to the effective assistance of 
counsel in deportation proceedings is rooted in due process, supported by 
sound logic, and now rejuvenated by the persuasive functionality of the 
Supreme Court’s decision in Padilla. 
One final counter-argument might be anticipated.  The constitutional right 
recognized in Padilla was a component of a fair procedure in a criminal case.  
One might reject the extension of that rationale to deportation proceedings, 
whatever similarities they might bear to criminal proceedings, not because of 
an increasingly unhelpful distinction between the civil and criminal labels, but 
because of the distinction between administrative and criminal penalties.  The 
latter differential, the argument might run, reflects the long-recognized unique 
nature of the criminal sanction.  Understandably, the courts have sought to 
ensure that the severe consequences of a criminal conviction—the loss of 
liberty, the permanent stigma, and all the possible civil disabilities—are not 
 
 97. See also Daniel Kanstroom, Deportation, Social Control, and Punishment: Some 
Thoughts about Why Hard Laws Make Bad Cases, 113 HARV. L. REV. 1890, 1898 (2000) 
(arguing that deportation orders based on post-conviction conduct are punitive in nature); 
Markowitz, supra note 91 (correlating the exclusion/deportation distinction with the 
civil/criminal distinction). 
 98. U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 
 99. 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1481 (2010). 
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inflicted unless the procedures leave us sufficiently confident that the person is 
in fact guilty. 
My answer is that that rationale for special procedural safeguards in 
criminal cases—a rationale I do not question—has nothing to do with the result 
in Padilla.  The Court’s reasoning rested neither on the guilt or innocence of 
the accused nor on the inherent severity of a criminal conviction.  It had 
everything to do with the nature and severity of deportation.  If deportation is 
both so punitive and so serious a consequence that counsel’s failure to advise 
about it in a criminal proceeding warrants withdrawal of a guilty plea, then a 
fortiori it would seem both punitive enough and serious enough to require 
some threshold level of effectiveness in the deportation proceeding itself. 
CONCLUSION 
The Supreme Court’s decision in Padilla v. Kentucky would have been 
noteworthy even if the Court had done nothing more than require criminal 
defense counsel to advise their noncitizen clients about the possibility of 
deportation.  That step alone would have been a giant leap forward in an area 
increasingly suffocated by formalities at odds with the reality of deportation.  
But the Court in fact did much more—more than even opening the door to the 
likelihood of similarly requiring advice concerning collateral consequences 
beyond deportation.  By abandoning the strict civil-criminal dichotomy that 
had isolated deportation from its criminal cousins and accepting a functional 
approach that recognized the close resemblance between these two interrelated 
legal regimes, the Supreme Court laid the logical foundation for resolving the 
constitutional issue raised in Compean.  The case for a constitutional right to 
the effective assistance of counsel in the deportation proceedings themselves 
was strong even before Padilla.  It is now compelling. 
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